Operation Decisive Storm is no guarantee of real victory

Operation Decisive Storm is no guarantee of real victory

The political objective in Yemen must be ensured


By NIZAR ABDEL-KADER
8/04/2015
NOW.


Saudi Arabia looks at Yemen as its backyard and has not been content to watch domestic turmoil in Yemen become a full-blown collapse of the central government, with the president being forced to flee in the face of Houthi rebel advances. But Foreign Minister Riyadh Yassin’s remarks in late March that there would be "no negotiations and dialogue" with the rebels until, ostensibly, they had been completely defeated—echoing calls by President Hadi that the Houthis remain under bombardment until annihilated—are troubling indications that the Saudi-led coalition may not have a viable political objective, which could trigger pointless and devastating consequences.

The Saudis quickly responded when Houthi rebels overran much of Yemen by assembling an air force of more than 150 planes from 10 Middle Eastern countries and launching an air campaign against them and army units loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

At the Arab League Summit in Sharm el-Sheikh the Egyptian proposal to establish an Arab intervention force that could eventually comprise 40,000 soldiers with air and naval force was agreed on. But this force would take several months to be organized, effectively leaving responses to developments in Yemen to the air force coalition.

In recent weeks, the campaign has been somewhat successful in flattening the Yemeni air defense system; destroying aircraft, air defense batteries, and major military infrastructures including command and control centers. But various reports have indicated that the Houthis and their allies have so far overrun much of Yemen and breaking reports indicate they are making advances in Aden.

General Ahmed Assiri, Saudi spokesman for the coalition, told reporters in Riyadh a few days ago that the “coalition operation will increase pressure on the Houthi militias, who will no longer have a safe haven within Yemen.” However, the latest developments in the city of Aden and the occupation of the Presidential Palace in are alarming. If the Houthis and Saleh’s renegade units are successful in occupying Aden, the air campaign will not have ensured the return of the legitimate president to Sanaa as the Saudi leadership and Arab League Summit proclaimed.

More alarming news came from the Red Sea’s strategic Bab-el-Mandeb Strait: the Houthis and soldiers of the 17th Armored Division loyal to Saleh have gained a foothold there. This is significant as 3.8 million barrels of oil pass through Bab-el-Mandeb each day en route to Europe, Asia, and the US, according to the EIA.

As it is developing, the air campaign can destroy the Yemeni infrastructure and kill thousands of rebels, though it could also kill thousands of civilians. Beyond this, it may well still fall short of achieving the return of the legitimate government and stability to the country. Modern history has taught us that air power alone, without a ground operation proceeding in parallel, cannot achieve real victory: the real victory in any war is fulfilled in the achievement of the political objective. Good examples of the failure of air power to achieving victory are the outcomes of Israel’s 2006 War on Lebanon and its wars on Gaza in 2008 and 2014.

As military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote, the political objectives of any war can be overshadowed by what he called the ‘law of the extreme’: “the will to overcome the enemy and make him powerless.” But as this law begins to lose its effectiveness on the ground and as its momentum wanes, he asserted, the political objective of the war must again assert itself. In the war in Yemen, the political objective is clearly defined as the return of the legitimate government to Yemen. This objective ought thus to determine the military strategy, and in this instance, the political and military objectives are the same. In other words, the objective is not to destroy the infrastructure of Yemen or destroy rebel forces, but rather to exercise overwhelming power over the Houthis so as to convince them to change their attitude and intentions and to negotiate for a settlement ensuring the return of the legitimate government to Sanaa.

In this war, like all wars, simply destroying the enemy does not constitute a political aim. Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, also a noted military historian and theorist, rightly noted that the real political aim of war is “the type of peace to follow.” As such, Saudi thinking must be given over to the political aims they announced at the start of Operation Decisive Storm. This, then, is likely to require a review of their war plan and a resetting of their priorities.

Adel al-Jubeir, Saudi ambassador to the US, said lately that “the operation began with airstrikes but the Kingdom and its allies stand ready to do whatever it takes,” to protect Hadi’s government. The ambassador’s declaration opened the possibility for a review of the war and the introduction of ground forces to strategic areas of Yemen. In light of this, amphibious operations may be necessary to secure Aden and prepare it for President Hadi’s return. In addition to this, Bab el-Mendeb Strait must be secured, and a ground operation from Saudi Arabia into Yemen in the area of Dahran-Junoub or Nejran seems most probable. Such moves on the ground alongside Omani diplomatic efforts to mediate an end to the war could bring the Houthis and their allies to a negotiating table in Riyadh or Doha.

The Saudis, the coalition leadership, and President Hadi and Foreign Minister Riad Yassin must all know that the solution is not to “keep bombing until the Houthi Shiite rebels are defeated.” They must take into consideration the necessity to do whatever is possible to bring all the Yemeni factions together to look for a political settlement.


Article Link:

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentary/565101-operation-decisive-storm-is-no-guarantee-of-real-victory

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