Is Russia Overextended?

Is Russia Overextended?

By Michael Rubin


September 8, 2015
Commentary Magazine


The big news on the international stage this past weekend was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s confirmation that Russia is actively involving itself in Syria’s civil war. Putin said that Russia is providing training and logistical supplies to the Syrian army, and wouldn’t rule out the possibility that Russia could consider much more direct intervention.

Proponents of moral equivalence might argue ‘So what?’ After all, President Barack Obama has involved the United States in the Syrian civil war by utilizing U.S. air power against the Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) and a lackluster effort to train ‘moderate’ Syrians. Nevertheless, there is a danger of U.S. and Russian forces working in such proximity without any interoperability and presumably very little communication.

A larger question might be how big can Putin go? After all, his resources aren’t unlimited. Indeed, sanctions, an unfriendly business climate in Russia (Putin has transformed his country into an embezzlement haven and the place investors go to have their investments confiscated) and the decline in international oil prices have all taken a bite.

At the same time, the Russian military is increasingly committed. Russian forces are committed in the North Caucasus, continue to occupy Georgia and prop up proxy states like South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Ukraine has become a morass, even for Russia’s elite units. Indeed, some Russian and Ukrainian journalists estimate that up to 3,000 Russian troops have already died in the Ukraine. (Indeed, a reasonable strategy for the next U.S. administration would be to rush supplies to Ukraine to raise the cost to the Kremlin of Russia’s occupation further). Peace in Tajikistan, where Russia also stations troops, is starting to unravel. And the Kremlin must be worried about the resurgence of the Taliban and the presence of ISIS in Afghanistan as U.S. forces withdrawal. Further pressure on the Baltics drains resources even further.


Add into the mix demography: The Muslim population in Russia is growing at a rate far greater than the ethnic Russian population. The annexation of the Crimea with its significant Tatar population only made the proportion of Muslims among the conscription pool for the Russian Army even greater. To then become involved in Syria? Putin will do what Putin will do, but the question is at what point will he stretch the Russian army, even its elite units, to the breaking point?

While President Obama has overseen the reduction of U.S. troop strength to pre-World War II levels, the all-volunteer U.S. Army is still better equipped than their conscript Russian equivalent. Obviously, cheap theatrics such as the ‘reset’ have failed. So too has Clinton advisor Ellen Tauscher’s “Mutually Assured Stability” initiative. Perhaps it’s time to call Putin’s bluff. If he’s going to deploy his forces around the world, we should prop up within reason those whom he targets to drive up his costs further.

For Putin, international relations and diplomacy have always been zero-sum games. He doesn’t like to lose, but he’s also wise enough not to pick a fight he isn’t certain of winning. He is calculating. If he can’t whip up national fervor with successful foreign adventures, then he won’t. And if there’s no low-hanging fruit to snatch against the backdrop of U.S. indecision and weakness, then he won’t make moves such as he’s doing in Syria now. If Putin is dangerously overextended; it’s time to add strain to his system.

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