The Second Conquest of Afghanistan
By MAX BOOT
September 28, 2015
Commentary
What used to be known as the Global War on Terrorism seems to be lurching from one defeat after another. In the Middle East, ISIS has taken control of cities from Palmyra to Mosul. Libya and Yemen and Syria and large swathes of Iraq have no effective governance, leaving their territory to be fought over between competing terrorist groups. Iran is getting stronger and doing more to sponsor terrorist groups from Lebanese Hezbollah to Asaib Ahl al-Haq in Iraq. And now, as if we didn’t have enough bad news already, comes word that Kunduz — a major city in northern Afghanistan — has fallen to the Taliban.
This has been a disaster that has been a long time in coming. Even in the days when there was a more sizable German garrison in northern Afghanistan, the Taliban had succeeded in making significant inroads there, in cooperation with groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. More recently — for the past year, in fact — the Taliban have all but surrounded Kunduz and Afghan forces have been powerless to dislodge them. As the New York Times notes, “Mohammad Yousuf Ayoubi, the head of the Kunduz provincial council, said that no major government offensive or reinforcement of the city had been taken up recently, even though it was clear the Taliban had been amassing at the city’s gates for months. He said 70 percent of the province outside of the city also remained under Taliban control.”
In fairness to the Afghan security forces, they have been hard-pressed in eastern and southern Afghanistan where the Taliban are also on the march and have succeeded in wresting back some rural districts that had once been secured by American soldiers and marines. As of July, Afghan forces had suffered 50 percent more casualties in 2015 than in the first six months of 2014, with more than 4,100 soldiers and police killed. That’s roughly twice as many fatalities as U.S. forces have suffered in Afghanistan since 2001 — and those were just six months of losses for the Afghan forces.
So the issue is not a lack of will on the part of Afghan forces—they are fighting and dying for their country. The problem is that the Afghan state remains deeply weak and corrupt, and the Taliban remain strong, thanks to the continuing support they receive from Pakistan. The New York Times had a good account yesterday of the problems in building the Afghan Air Force, which, despite a large American investment, remains far from fully functional.
The U.S. has so far been filling the gaps in Afghan’s weak security structure. The U.S. has just under 10,000 troops in Afghanistan (an arbitrary troop cap dictated by President Obama), and still engages in active bombing and Special Operations missions in support of Afghan forces. General John Campbell, the commander of Operation Resolute Support (as the multinational mission in Afghanistan is now known), continues to play a vital role advising the Afghan government.
But even now the reduced American commitment — down from 100,000 personnel at the peak (itself an inadequate figure for so large a country) — is helping to enable Taliban gains. The U.S. Air Force, for example, has aircraft at only three bases in the country — at Bagram, Jalalabad, and Kandahar — none of them close to the north where Kunduz is located.
The real question mark is what happens at the end of 2016, when President Obama has vowed to withdraw U.S. troops entirely. General Campbell has apparently just submitted some troop options to Washington. According to the Wall Street Journal, “The options include keeping the current U.S. presence at or near 10,000; reducing it slightly to 8,000; cutting the force roughly in half; and continuing with current plans to draw down to a force of several hundred troops by the end of 2016.” There is little doubt that in Campbell’s estimation, and in the estimation of any unbiased observer, pulling out all the troops is a high-risk option. That’s military-speak for “suicidal.” The safest option would be not just to keep the 10,000 troops there now but to at least double their numbers, but that option isn’t even on the table with this White House. Ten thousand troops is a bare minimum to allow the state of Afghanistan to survive and to prevent the Taliban from undoing all that the U.S. and its allies have sought to achieve since 9/11.
Even with 10,000 troops present, the Taliban, as we can see, are still able to make gains. But at least the state is unlikely to entirely collapse. If, however, Obama carries through on his pledge to withdraw all of the troops, Afghanistan is likely to lapse into the kind of sectarian civil war that already grips Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, among others.
What used to be known as the Global War on Terrorism seems to be lurching from one defeat after another. In the Middle East, ISIS has taken control of cities from Palmyra to Mosul. Libya and Yemen and Syria and large swathes of Iraq have no effective governance, leaving their territory to be fought over between competing terrorist groups. Iran is getting stronger and doing more to sponsor terrorist groups from Lebanese Hezbollah to Asaib Ahl al-Haq in Iraq. And now, as if we didn’t have enough bad news already, comes word that Kunduz — a major city in northern Afghanistan — has fallen to the Taliban.
This has been a disaster that has been a long time in coming. Even in the days when there was a more sizable German garrison in northern Afghanistan, the Taliban had succeeded in making significant inroads there, in cooperation with groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. More recently — for the past year, in fact — the Taliban have all but surrounded Kunduz and Afghan forces have been powerless to dislodge them. As the New York Times notes, “Mohammad Yousuf Ayoubi, the head of the Kunduz provincial council, said that no major government offensive or reinforcement of the city had been taken up recently, even though it was clear the Taliban had been amassing at the city’s gates for months. He said 70 percent of the province outside of the city also remained under Taliban control.”
In fairness to the Afghan security forces, they have been hard-pressed in eastern and southern Afghanistan where the Taliban are also on the march and have succeeded in wresting back some rural districts that had once been secured by American soldiers and marines. As of July, Afghan forces had suffered 50 percent more casualties in 2015 than in the first six months of 2014, with more than 4,100 soldiers and police killed. That’s roughly twice as many fatalities as U.S. forces have suffered in Afghanistan since 2001 — and those were just six months of losses for the Afghan forces.
So the issue is not a lack of will on the part of Afghan forces—they are fighting and dying for their country. The problem is that the Afghan state remains deeply weak and corrupt, and the Taliban remain strong, thanks to the continuing support they receive from Pakistan. The New York Times had a good account yesterday of the problems in building the Afghan Air Force, which, despite a large American investment, remains far from fully functional.
The U.S. has so far been filling the gaps in Afghan’s weak security structure. The U.S. has just under 10,000 troops in Afghanistan (an arbitrary troop cap dictated by President Obama), and still engages in active bombing and Special Operations missions in support of Afghan forces. General John Campbell, the commander of Operation Resolute Support (as the multinational mission in Afghanistan is now known), continues to play a vital role advising the Afghan government.
But even now the reduced American commitment — down from 100,000 personnel at the peak (itself an inadequate figure for so large a country) — is helping to enable Taliban gains. The U.S. Air Force, for example, has aircraft at only three bases in the country — at Bagram, Jalalabad, and Kandahar — none of them close to the north where Kunduz is located.
The real question mark is what happens at the end of 2016, when President Obama has vowed to withdraw U.S. troops entirely. General Campbell has apparently just submitted some troop options to Washington. According to the Wall Street Journal, “The options include keeping the current U.S. presence at or near 10,000; reducing it slightly to 8,000; cutting the force roughly in half; and continuing with current plans to draw down to a force of several hundred troops by the end of 2016.” There is little doubt that in Campbell’s estimation, and in the estimation of any unbiased observer, pulling out all the troops is a high-risk option. That’s military-speak for “suicidal.” The safest option would be not just to keep the 10,000 troops there now but to at least double their numbers, but that option isn’t even on the table with this White House. Ten thousand troops is a bare minimum to allow the state of Afghanistan to survive and to prevent the Taliban from undoing all that the U.S. and its allies have sought to achieve since 9/11.
Even with 10,000 troops present, the Taliban, as we can see, are still able to make gains. But at least the state is unlikely to entirely collapse. If, however, Obama carries through on his pledge to withdraw all of the troops, Afghanistan is likely to lapse into the kind of sectarian civil war that already grips Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, among others.
Article Link to Commentary Magazine:
0 Response to " The Second Conquest of Afghanistan"
Post a Comment